Security findings on the line that causes them.

Vulnerable dependencies, insecure code, leaked secrets, container and infrastructure misconfiguration, in your editor while you are still holding the problem in your head. Scanning runs on your machine; your source code never leaves it. The same engine runs in your pipeline, so nothing is a surprise at the pull request.

Read the documentation

CI tells you after you have moved on

Scanning in a pipeline is not wrong, it is late. By the time it reports something you have written the code, opened the pull request and started on the next thing. The fix becomes an interruption: context rebuilt from scratch, queued behind current work, argued about in review, and sometimes shipped anyway with a ticket attached. The change itself is usually one line; everything around it is the expensive part. The same finding on the line, while you are still looking at it, is a thirty-second decision.

5 kinds of finding, because attackers do not specialise

Most editor security extensions cover one thing: dependencies, or secrets, or static analysis. Real incidents rarely respect that boundary.

Dependencies

Vulnerable packages across 40+ ecosystems, direct and transitive, anchored to the line that declares them, with the safe version to move to and the chain that introduced it.

Code

790 rules for command and SQL injection, unsafe deserialization, weak cryptography, path traversal, SSRF and authentication mistakes, evaluated as you type.

Secrets

1,090 credential patterns for cloud keys, tokens, private keys and connection strings, checked when you save the file.

Containers

End-of-life base images, root users, remote ADD, unpinned installs, secrets baked into layers, privileged containers and mounted Docker sockets.

Infrastructure

Terraform, OpenTofu, Kubernetes and Helm checked for public storage, open security groups, IAM wildcards and unencrypted databases.

Not in the extension yet

The CLI does these today; the editor does not. Dependency findings and the version-bump quick fix are on the pre-release line (0.3.x); the stable line has the code, secret, container and infrastructure checks. The full list is in the docs.

SBOM and VEX generation

CycloneDX and SPDX SBOMs and OpenVEX statements. Today: vulnetix scan and vulnetix vex in a terminal.

Licence findings and policy

Copyleft and policy checks on dependencies. Today: vulnetix license in a terminal.

Package-manager overrides

Pinning a transitive dependency you cannot upgrade through its parent. Today: fix the parent, or write the override yourself.

Sign in from the editor

Signing in without leaving VS Code. Today: vulnetix auth login in a terminal, which the extension then uses.

Your code does not leave your machine

Not a policy, an architecture. The rule set is compiled into a binary on your disk and evaluated in a process on your machine. Matching a dependency to known advisories does require asking something, because there is no local copy of the vulnerability database, and what is sent is package coordinates such as pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20. Never your code, your file paths or your repository name. Turn dependency lookups off entirely and code, secret, container and infrastructure scanning still work in full, offline.

13 editors, because forks are where developers went

Only Microsoft's own builds of VS Code may use the Visual Studio Marketplace. Every fork uses Open VSX instead, and most security extensions never publish there, which quietly excludes a large share of working developers. Vulnesis publishes to both.

Cloud workspaces are included, and worth being precise about: Gitpod, Coder, code-server and Firebase Studio present a browser interface but run the extension next to your files, so scanning there is exactly as capable as on a laptop. The exception is vscode.dev and github.dev: they have no filesystem and cannot load the extension at all.

An extension is a delivery mechanism. The data is the product.

Two extensions can look identical, draw the same squiggle, and disagree completely about what you should do next, because the difference is not the editor integration. It is what the underline can be joined to. The Vulnesis VDB aggregates 150+ upstream sources, enumerable through the public /v1/sources endpoint, across 4.8M advisory records and 173M affected-version rows, and every record type below can be attached to a dependency finding.

Four KEV catalogues, not one

CISA, the EU/ENISA catalogue, VulnCheck and the Vulnesis KEV. CISA entries carry the binding remediation due date and required action; the others do not, and a finding says which catalogue it came from.

20 exploit sources, counted per source

ExploitDB, Metasploit, Nuclei, VulnCheck XDB, CrowdSec, GitHub proof-of-concepts, HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, MISP, nmap NSE and Shadowserver among them, each with its own count and first and last observation dates.

End-of-life release data

A runtime, framework or base image that stopped receiving security fixes never gets an advisory saying so. Lifecycle records cover the product, its releases and their support dates, so an abandoned version is a finding rather than a silence.

Malware and typosquat records

Published packages confirmed malicious, with the evidence, the indicators and, where attribution exists, the actor. A malicious package rarely has a CVE at all, so this is a separate record type to advisories.

This is not a claim about anyone's roadmap, it is a claim about data. An extension backed by an advisory feed answers advisory questions well. "Is this runtime still supported?", "is this package malicious?" and "what do I deploy while I wait for the patch?" have no advisory to answer them: support ending produces no CVE, malicious packages rarely receive one, and detection content is normally a separate product. Vulnesis answers them from end-of-life release records, malware records, and Snort, Suricata, YARA and Nuclei content returned whole. The same records answer the same questions in the CLI, in CI, in the Resolve Platform and through the MCP server.

Severity that means something

A CVSS score says how bad a vulnerability would be if exploited. It says nothing about whether anyone is exploiting it. Every dependency finding carries CISA KEV membership and EPSS probability, and on Pro the exploit activity too. Ten weaponised issues you can work through beats three hundred theoretical ones you cannot.

It tells you what to change

Safe version selection within a major-version budget you set, offered as a quick fix on the line that declares the dependency. Fixes apply as editor edits, so undo works and unsaved buffers are respected, and a version flagged as malware is never offered. The extension does not run your package manager: run it yourself to update the lockfile.

Frequently asked

Does my source code leave my machine?

No. Scanning is local: the rule set is compiled into a binary on your disk and evaluated in a process on your machine. Matching a dependency to known advisories sends package coordinates such as pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20, never code, file paths or repository names. Disable dependency lookups and code, secret, container and infrastructure scanning still work fully offline.

Does it work in Cursor, Windsurf and VSCodium?

Yes. Only Microsoft’s own builds of VS Code may use the Visual Studio Marketplace, so Vulnesis is published to Open VSX as well. That covers Cursor, Windsurf, VSCodium, code-server, Gitpod, Coder, Eclipse Theia, OpenVSCode Server, Firebase Studio, Kiro, Positron and Trae.

Does it work in browser-based editors?

Cloud workspaces such as Gitpod, Coder, code-server and Firebase Studio are fully supported, because the extension runs next to your files rather than in the browser sandbox. vscode.dev and github.dev have no filesystem and no ability to start a process, so they cannot load the extension at all.

Will it slow my editor down?

A language server holds the compiled rule set in memory, so a check as you type costs around 10 milliseconds. The expensive rules, secret detection, are deferred to save rather than throttled everywhere, which is measured rather than assumed.

Is it the same as what runs in CI?

Yes, deliberately. The extension drives the same binary as your pipeline, against the same rules, so what vulnetix scan reports in CI is what your editor already showed you.

Do I need an account?

No. Scanning works signed out on the community tier. Ranked safe versions and exploit data on dependency findings need a Pro plan, and the hover card says so rather than reporting that none exist. Sign in with vulnetix auth login in a terminal; the extension uses those credentials.

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